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Chapter Ten -- Law Enforcement Investigations Involving Journalists
Jack Lerner and Rom Bar-Nissim
I. Introduction
How is the government able to investigate former National Security Agency employee
Thomas A. Drake and former CIA employee Jeffrey Alexander Sterling for their leaks to
journalists? What legal tools can federal law enforcement use to obtain the identity of a
leaker and reveal information about the leak? What constitutional and statutory
safeguards exist to protect media recipients of the leak, like the reporters James Risen of
The New York Times and James Rosen of Fox News? Do internal guidelines at the
Department of Justice shape its behavior? This chapter will answer these questions.
The legal tools available to the government to investigate leaks of classified information
can be divided into three overarching categories:
1. compelling the recipient of the leak to disclose information about the
whistleblower and the leak through a conventional search warrant or subpoena;
2. obtaining information about the whistleblower and the leak through
contemporaneous surveillance as authorized by laws such as the Wiretap Act and the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act;
3. retrieving information from third parties about the whistleblower and the leak
through subpoenas, search warrants, and court orders authorized by laws such as the
Stored Communications Act.
These investigatory powers are limited, of course, by the First and Fourth Amendments.
In addition, Congress and state legislatures often pass legislation extending legal
protections to journalists when the Supreme Court refuses to recognize Fourth
Amendment protections or First Amendment safeguards. Where legislation has been
enacted, however, the power of both the government’s investigatory tools and protections
for journalists can vary tremendously from one jurisdiction to another.1

II. Going After the Source: Compelling Disclosure through Warrants and
Subpoenas
1

The Whistleblower Protection Act protects whistleblowers that disclose information to
the government from prosecution, but it does not protect those who disclose to third
parties. 10 U.S.C. § 1034(a-b). As for the press, the Supreme Court has clearly indicated
in cases such as the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713
(1971), and Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) that the government cannot prevent
journalists from publishing truthful information that they have obtained lawfully.
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A. Seizure of Work Product: Search Warrants
When the government executes a search warrant against the media, it is generally looking
for a journalist’s work product. A journalist’s notes or pictures may provide valuable
information about a whistleblower and the leak. Consequently, the friction between the
legitimate objectives of law enforcement and constitutional protections against
unreasonable search and seizure and guarantees of a free press are most apparent when a
search warrant is directed at the media.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects the public against “unreasonable
searches and seizures” by the government. It states that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.” 2 The Supreme Court ruled in Katz v. US that warrantless
searches into legally protected areas are presumptively invalid.3
In his influential concurrence in Katz, Justice John M. Harlan said the government
violated the Fourth Amendment because it conducted a warrantless search where the
individual maintained a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” He stated that, in order for
an individual to have “a reasonable expectation of privacy,” the person’s belief must be
objectively and subjectively reasonable.4 An individual has no objective expectation of
privacy if society in general would not recognize it as such—as with, for example, an
easily overhead conversation held in the middle of Grand Central Station, even if the
conversants intended the conversation to be private. A person has no subjective
expectation of privacy if he or she doesn’t actually think the conversation will be
private—as with a conversation conducted in one’s home, when the person knows that
his or her conversant intends to repeat it to others.
A valid search warrant must meet certain constitutional requirements. The Fourth
Amendment requires warrants (1) to be issued by a judge, (2) to be based on probable
cause, (3) to be supported by oath or affirmation, (4) to describe with particularity (a) the
location to be searched and (b) the items to be seized. 5
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,6 the Supreme Court addressed the inherent friction between
the First Amendment’s guarantee of a free press and law enforcement’s ability to search
newsrooms and journalists for evidence of criminal activity. The Stanford Daily covered
a violent campus demonstration at which demonstrators assaulted policemen. The police
executed a valid search warrant at The Stanford Daily’s headquarters seeking
unpublished photos that could identify the assailants.7 The Supreme Court rejected the
2

U.S. Const. amend. IV.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4
Id. at 361.
5
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
6
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
7
Id. at 550-51.
3
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newspaper’s argument that the First Amendment restricted, if not prevented, executing a
search warrant against the press,8 reasoning that the warrant requirements of the Fourth
Amendment were sufficient to safeguard against any potential “chilling effect” from
executing search warrants against the press.9
In response, Congress passed The Privacy Protection Act of 1980.10 The PPA protects the
press and others from searches of any work product by law enforcement for purposes of a
criminal investigation. The PPA applies when the individual in possession of the material
is “reasonably believed” to have the material in order to “disseminate [it] to the public
[in] a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication.”11
There are substantial limitations to the scope of the PPA. First, it does not apply when
there is probable cause that the media recipient is subject to a criminal investigation.
While the crime cannot be merely “receiving, possessing, communicating or withholding
the materials,” the statute creates exceptions for crimes involving classified
information.12 Therefore, a court may consider a disclosed leak containing national
security and classified information as a crime and, as such, outside the PPA’s
protection.13 Second, the PPA does not apply if authorities have “reason to believe that
the immediate seizure of such materials is necessary to prevent the death of, or serious
bodily injury to, a human being.”14
B. Compelled Disclosure of Sources: Subpoenas and The Reporter’s Privilege
During a criminal investigation, the government may compel disclosure of information
about the whistleblower and the leak by subpoenaing the recipient.15 Again, since the
recipients of the leak tend to be the press, the issue arises whether the recipient can
exercise a “reporter’s privilege” to preserve the whistleblower’s anonymity.
The Supreme Court addressed whether a reporter must divulge the identity of a
confidential source pursuant to a grand jury subpoena in Branzburg v. Hayes.16 Paul
Branzburg was a reporter for The Courier-Journal in Louisville, Ky., who wrote two
8

Id. at 553-54.
Id. at 563-67.
10
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa.
11
Id.
12
Id. at §§ 2000aa(a)(1), 2000aa(b)(1).
13
Id. See e.g., Sennett v. United States, 667 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2012);
Binion v. City of St. Paul, 788 F. Supp. 2d 935 (D. Minn. 2011).
14
Id. at §§ 2000aa(a)(2), 2000aa(b)(2).
15
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45; Fed. R. Crim. P. 41. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding district court’s contempt order
against New York Times journalist who refused to name Scooter Libby as the source of
the leak that revealed Valarie Plame was a CIA agent).
16
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
9
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articles on marijuana use; his sources conditioned their participation on Branzburg
protecting their anonymity. Branzburg was subpoenaed to reveal the identity of his
sources before a grand jury investigating the criminal activity in the article. Branzburg
refused and claimed that the First Amendment provides a “reporter’s privilege”
protecting him from revealing the identity of his confidential sources.17
In a plurality opinion by Justice Byron White, the Supreme Court rejected Branzburg’s
argument and held that the First Amendment does not protect a reporter’s right to conceal
criminal conduct by refusing to answer a grand jury’s questions, and consequently the
First Amendment does not establish an unqualified reporter’s privilege, at least not in the
context of a grand jury investigation.18
Far more influential was Justice Lewis Powell’s concurring opinion.19 His objective was
to address the concern raised in Stewart’s dissent that Branzburg would turn the press
into the “investigative arm of the government.”20 While he agreed that there was no
unqualified reporter’s privilege, he rejected the notion that the government had unfettered
discretion to subpoena reporters. Powell stated that, while a reporter cannot challenge the
government’s general authority to issue a subpoena against the press,21 the reporter could
file a motion to quash, if “the grand jury investigation is not conducted in good faith,”
such as when the questions directed to the reporter are only remotely related to the
subject of the investigation, or revealing the confidential source would not advance
legitimate law enforcement goals.22 In such scenarios, the judge would have discretion on
a case-by-case basis to “balance the competing interests” between freedom of the press
and the requirement that citizens testify with respect to criminal conduct.23
Branzburg and the reporter’s privilege remains a hotly contested issue to this day. Federal
and state courts interpreting Branzburg have come to vastly different conclusions about
whether a reporter’s privilege exists outside a grand jury context. In 2013, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to recognize a reporter’s privilege when New
York Times reporter James Risen refused to testify in Jeffrey Sterling’s trial for crimes
related to the disclosure of classified documents.24 In January 2014, Risen petitioned the
Supreme Court to hear the case.25 In June 2014 the Supreme Court rejected Risen’s
petition.

17

Id. at 667-68.
Id. at 692.
19
Id. at 709-10.
20
Id. at 725. It is worth noting that Justice Stewart himself leaked information about the
inner workings of the Supreme Court to Bob Woodward in The Brethren.
21
Id. at 710 n. *.
22
Id. at 709-10.
23
Id. at 710 n. *.
24
US v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 2013).
25
Risen v. US, Petition for writ of certiorari, http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/sterling/011314petition.pdf.
18
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In jurisdictions that do recognize a reporter’s privilege, the legal treatment varies
tremendously in terms of who is covered, what is covered, and the type of proceeding in
question. A full discussion of the various treatments of the reporter’s privilege is beyond
the scope of this chapter.26
As of 2014, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have reporter shield statutes.27
Congress, however, has attempted and failed to pass reporter’s shield legislation on more
than 100 occasions.28 After the 2013 disclosures by former National Security Agency
contractor Edward Snowden regarding the NSA’s surveillance practices, Congress once
again considered the issue.29

III. Surveillance: Contemporaneous Interception of Information
When leaks occur, the government may engage in surveillance of both the whistleblower
and recipient in order to gain information for a criminal investigation into the leak.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,30 which amended the older
Wiretap Act31 and included the Pen Register Act32 and Stored Communications Act,33
articulates the procedures and circumstances under which the government may engage in
telephone surveillance and electronic surveillance, or retrieve information involving
telephone or electronic communications. ECPA and these other Acts cover a wide range
of electronic communications, including phone calls, emails, text messages, voicemails,
instant messages, and any other form of electronic communication.34 The statutes thus
directly affect websites offering email and cloud storage services such as Google,
Microsoft, and Apple, as well as telecommunication companies such as Verizon and
AT&T, because law enforcement agencies use ECPA and the other statutes to order such
services to assist them with interception or retrieval.
A. Interception of Communications

We urge readers seeking more information on the reporter’s privilege to visit The
Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press’s website. RCFP, The Reporter’s
Privilege, http://www.rcfp.org/reporters-privilege.
27 RCFP, The Reporter’s Privilege Compendium: An Introduction,
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/guides/reporters-privilege/introduction.
28
Mark A. Franklin, David A. Anderson & Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Mass Media Law:
Cases and Materials, 465 (8th ed. 2011).
29
The Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, S. 987, 113th Cong. (2013)
30
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986)
31
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
32
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.
33
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712.
34
18 U.S.C. § 2510.
26
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ECPA prohibits interception of communications without court authorization. The statute
defines “intercept” as the “aural or other acquisition of the contents” of various kinds of
communications by means of “electronic, mechanical or other devices.”35 ECPA sets
forth strict requirements that must be met in order to obtain a warrant to intercept
electronic communications and phone calls. First, the application must include a full and
complete statement of the particulars of the investigation, communication sought, and
necessity for the wiretap.36 Second, the judge must determine:
1. Is there probable cause to believe that the subject of the wiretap committed, or
is about to commit, one of the enumerated offense in the statute,?
2. Is there probable cause to believe that information concerning the crime will be
obtained by the interception?
3. Are alternative investigative procedures ineffective, unlikely to succeed, or too
dangerous?
4. And, is there probable cause that the location of the wiretap will yield the
sought for communication?37
Under the act, the government only needs to notify the target of the surveillance ninety
days after the surveillance has commenced.38
B. Interception of Location and Movement: Tracking Devices and US v.
Jones
If the recipient and the whistleblower decide to communicate only in person, tracking
devices enable law enforcement to follow the recipient to the whistleblower. The search
warrant issued against Fox News reporter James Rosen states that the FBI used security
access card information to determine that Rosen and State Department security adviser
Stephen Jin-Woo Kim met face-to-face. Because an individual’s movements in public are
in plain view for all to see, the government can track a person’s movements by physically
following them in public. However, once the government employs remote tracking
devices, a search warrant may be required.

35

18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). There is considerable uncertainty as to the scope of the
definition. See Charles Doyle, Privacy: An Overview of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Congressional Research Service
No. 7-5700, R41733 (2012), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41733.pdf.
36
18 U.S.C. § 2818(1)
37
Id. at § 2518(3). The statute also contains an “emergency situation” exception, among
many others, that allows the government to engage in surveillance forty-eight hours prior
to obtaining a warrant. An “emergency situation” is when law enforcement “reasonably
determines” that (1) there are grounds to issue the warrant and (2) either (a) there is an
immediate danger of death or serious injury to a person or (b) involve conspiratorial
activities that either (i) threaten national security or (ii) are characteristic of organized
crime. Id. at § 2518(7).
38
Id. at § 2518(8)(d).
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In 1983, the Supreme Court held in US v. Knotts that placing a tracking device in a
container with the owner’s consent, prior to the defendant taking possession, did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.39 In 2012, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held in US
v. Jones that placing a GPS tracking device underneath a person’s car without a warrant
or the person’s consent does violate the Fourth Amendment.40 The court distinguished its
holding from Knotts by noting that the tracking device in Knotts was originally placed in
the container with the previous owner’s consent, while in Jones the tracking device was
placed without anyone’s consent; the latter, the court held, amounts to an unreasonable
search. The fact the car was in plain view to the public did not make placing the tracking
device on the car any more reasonable, given the vast amounts of personal information a
tracking device can collect.41

IV. Retrieving Information from Others: Subpoenas Directed at Third Parties
A. Retrieval of Telephone Records: The Pen Register Act
The term “pen register” refers to a device or process that collects the numbers of all
outgoing telephone calls,42 while a trap and trace device collects the numbers of all
incoming calls. The contents of the conversation are not obtained with either
technology.43
During a criminal investigation, retrieval of a person’s phone records may provide insight
into a person’s relationships. In the context of leaks, the government may place a pen
register and a trap and trace device (collectively referred to as “pen registers”) to
establish a connection between the whistleblower and the recipient of the leak. For

39

460 U.S. 276, 278-82 (1983).
132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
41
Id. at 951-53.
42
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).
43
Id. at § 3127(4). As this book went to press, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in U.S. v. Wurie, a case involving the government’s search of Wurie’s cell
phone after he was arrested. Orin Kerr, Initial impressions from the oral arguments in the
Supreme Court cell phone search cases, [hereinafter “Kerr’s Impressions”] The
Washington Post (April, 29 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/04/29/initial-impressions-from-the-oral-argument-in-the-supremecourt-cell-phone-search-cases/. In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court held in U.S. v.
Robinson that “a full search of a person” who is “subject to a lawful custodial arrest”
does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 414 U.S. 218, 235. According to Orin Kerr, the
Supreme Court seems to want to create a new rule that is sensitive to new technology,
like cellphones. Kerr impressions.
40
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example, the Rosen search warrant uses information from a pen register to establish the
connection between Rosen and Kim to support probable cause.44
As we discuss above, a person might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
content of one’s communications, like a phone call.45 In Smith v. Maryland, however, the
Supreme Court held that the warrantless use of pen registers does not violate the Fourth
Amendment because “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”46 Under this “Third Party Doctrine,” once the
subscriber dials the phone number, he or she discloses the number to a third party – the
telephone company. Once disclosed, the telephone subscriber loses his “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in his phone records, and therefore, a search warrant is not
required.47
Congress responded by enacting The Pen Register Act. The Pen Register Act applies to
both federal and state law enforcement48 and sets forth the requirements for installing pen
registers or trap and trace devices.49 The legal standard for granting a pen register
application is significantly lower than a search warrant, which requires probable cause.
To obtain an order requiring a telecommunications company to install a pen register, the
government only needs to show that the information is “relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation being conducted by that agency.”50 Granted requests are valid for sixty days
and can be extended only upon renewing the application.51 The government may request
that the target of the surveillance not be notified, 52 and frequently does so.
B. Retrieval of Electronic Communications: The Stored Communications Act
Digital communications create analytic problems under the Fourth Amendment. As we
discussed above, the Third Party Doctrine states that “a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”53 This
means that in the digital realm, individuals may lose Fourth Amendment protection for
their digital communications because they are sent and stored through third party service
providers.

44

Ryan Lizza, The D.O.J. versus James Rosen, The New Yorker, (May 20, 2013)
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/05/the-doj-versus-journalistgmail.html [hereinafter Rosen Search Warrant].
45
289 U.S. 347.
46
Id. at 743-44.
47
Id. at 744-45.
48
18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(2).
49
18 U.S.C. § 3123.
50
Id. at § 3123(a)(1).
51
Id. at § 3123(a)(c).
52
Id. at § 3123(d).
53
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 744-45.
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The Stored Communications Act governs when the government may obtain a court order
requiring an electronic communications service provider (such as an email service,
website, or telecommunications company) to disclose the contents of the communication
or the subscriber’s records.54 The SCA is regularly used to investigate leaks. In Thomas
A. Drake’s indictment, the government used the SCA to obtain emails between Drake
and a reporter to support charges that Drake retained confidential materials.55 Along
similar lines, the Rosen search warrant was aimed at retrieving Rosen’s emails to show
that Kim illegally disclosed confidential information.56 And Jeffrey Sterling’s emails to
James Risen were retrieved pursuant to the SCA and used as evidence to prove Sterling
violated the Espionage Act.57
In light of the Third Party Doctrine, the government’s ability to avail itself of the SCA is
significantly easier than obtaining a search warrant, depending on whether the
communications have been in storage for more than 180 days. For communications less
than 180 days old, the government must obtain a search warrant pursuant to the
procedures articulated by the jurisdiction in order to compel providers to supply the
content of wire or electronic communications.58 For communications older than 180
days, however, the government only needs to state “specific and articulable facts” that
provide “reasonable grounds” that the information sought is “relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.”59 The government’s authority under the SCA is limited
to aiding criminal investigations, not civil actions.60
In addition, the SCA alters the notice requirement for court orders issued pursuant to the
SCA.61 If the government obtains judicial authorization to retrieve the communication
under the SCA, the SCA provides that the government may delay notification for up to
ninety days,62 or not notify the target at all.63 In availing itself of either provision, the
government must show that disclosure will cause an “adverse result.”64 Adverse results
are defined as either (1) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual, (2) flight
from prosecution, (3) destruction of or tampering with evidence, (4) intimidation of
potential witnesses or (5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly
54

18 U.S.C. § 2703.
US v. Drake, Indictment, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2010/04/drakeindict.pdf.
56
Rosen Search Warrant, supra, n. 44.
57
US v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 488 (4th Cir. 2013).
58
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a-b).
59
Id. at § 2703(d).
60
Id.; See also Federal Trade Comm’n v. Netscape Communications Corp., 196 F.R.D.
559, 561 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 350 (E.D. Mich.
2008); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC, 550 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611 (E.D. Va.
2008).
61
18 U.S.C. § 2705.
62
Id. at § 2705(a)(1).
63
Id. at § 2705(b).
64
Id. at §§ 2705(a)(1-2) & 2705(b)
55

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2530799

Page 10 of 15

delaying trial. 65 Furthermore, the government may renew a request to delay notice if an
“adverse result” still exists.66
The SCA also authorizes the government to obtain a court order directing the service
provider to disclose the subscriber’s records. Such information can include the
subscriber’s name, contact information, payment information and usage history.67
Importantly, the government does not need to notify the subscriber when solely
requesting subscriber records.68
V. A Brief Discussion of FISA and USA PATRIOT Act
A discussion of the government’s investigation techniques would be incomplete without
mentioning the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act69 and the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act -- USA PATRIOT Act.70 While a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this
chapter, it is worth mentioning how FISA and the USA PATRIOT Act have been used
for domestic surveillance activities.
The USA PATRIOT Act and two other statutes authorize the National Security
Administration, FBI, and other federal agencies to issue National Security Letters, and
obtain information without a court order if the information is “relevant to an authorized
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities.”71 The service provider cannot notify the subscriber of the NSL.72 While the
service provider may petition to modify or set aside an NSL, a court will only grant a
request upon the service provider showing that there is “no reason to believe that
disclosure may endanger the national security of the United States” or a criminal
investigation.73 If the FBI or the Department of Justice certifies that disclosure would
endanger national security or interfere with an investigation, the certification is
“conclusive unless the court finds that the certification was made in bad faith.”74
Section 215 of The USA PATRIOT ACT, commonly referred to as the “business
records” provision, authorizes the government to obtain “tangible things” from U.S.
persons under strict secrecy if “presumptively relevant to an authorized investigation” to
obtain “foreign intelligence information” or “to protect against international terrorism or

65

Id. at §§ 2705(a)(5)(B) & 2705(b).
Id. at § 2705(a)(4).
67
Id. at § 2703(c)(2).
68
Id. at § 2703(c)(3).
69
50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.
70
Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
71
18 U.S.C. § 2709(a)-(b).
72
18 U.S.C. §2709(c)(1).
73
18 U.S.C. §3511(b)(2).
74
18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(2).
66
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clandestine intelligence activities.”75 The FISA Court’s interpretation of “tangible things”
goes beyond “books, records, papers, documents, and other items” to encompass phone
records, also known as telephony metadata.76 It was pursuant to this provision that NSA
has been able to obtain broad orders for metadata from major telephone companies.
FISA requires a nexus between the surveillance activity and national security. FISA
authorizes the attorney general and the director of national intelligence to monitor
electronic communications containing “foreign intelligence information” and gives the
government broad leeway in defining what constitutes “foreign intelligence
information.”77 However, FISA does require a showing of probable cause that the target
is “a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power” and that the facilities at which
surveillance is directed is being used or about to be used by “a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power.”78
Despite the nexus requirement, the National Security Administration has used its FISA
authority to engage in wide-ranging domestic surveillance activity. Most notably, the
NSA ordered Verizon to hand over all its subscribers’ telephone records.79 While there is
no evidence that NSA surveillance was used to target journalists, the documents obtained
by Snowden and published, in part, in The Washington Post and The Guardian did reveal
a program to target and discredit “radicalizers” by gathering records of online sexual
activity and visits to pornographic websites.80
In addition, a leaked copy of the Internal Revenue Service’s agent manual revealed that,
since at least 2005, the Drug Enforcement Administration has provided information

75

50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2).
See “Verizon Forced to Hand over Telephone Data—Full Court Order,” The Guardian,
June 5, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizontelephone-data-court-order [hereinafter Verizon Court Order]. The term metadata
generally refers to data that “does not contain personal or content-specific details, but
rather transactional information about the user, the device and activities taking place.” “A
Guardian Guide to Your Metadata,” The Guardian (last visited October 4, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/interactive/2013/jun/12/what-is-metadata-nsasurveillance#meta=1000000. Metadata regarding an email includes: the sender's and
recipients name, email and IP addresses, and the subject of email. Id.
77
50 U.S.C. § 1801(e);
78
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a), 1801(h)(1). F
79
Verizon Court Order, supra, n. 76.
80
“Top-Secret Document Reveals NSA Spied On Porn Habits As Part Of Plan to
Discredit ‘Radicalizers,” The Huffington Post, Nov. 26, 2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html.
76
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obtained from NSA surveillance to the IRS and other agencies.81 In addition, the manual
directs agents to alter the investigative trail to conceal use of NSA surveillance.82
VI. The Department of Justice’s Policy Regarding Obtaining Information from the
Press
The Department of Justice has established guidelines on obtaining information from the
news media that set forth internal procedural requirements that the DOJ must follow,
including under what circumstances it can seek information from the press or pursue a
criminal investigation against a reporter. Violation of the guidelines does not give rise to
a cause of action or legal remedy.
The guidelines have undergone recent changes due to two disclosures in May 2013
revealing the DOJ’s aggressive tactics in obtaining information from the press. On May
13, 2013, the Associated Press reported that the DOJ obtained the phone records of AP
journalists.83 The DOJ gave no official reason why it made the request.84 On May 23,
2013, The Washington Post published online the DOJ’s search warrant application for
Fox News’ Rosen’s emails.85 The request was made during the DOJ’s investigation into
whether Kim, the State Department contractor, violated the Espionage Act when he
leaked classified information about North Korea to Rosen.86
On May 23, 2013, responding to intense criticism, President Barack Obama ordered the
DOJ to review its guidelines towards journalists.87 On July 12, 2013, the DOJ produced a

81

John Shiffman and David Ingram, “Exclusive: IRS Manual Detailed DEA's Use of
Hidden Intel Evidence,” Reuters, Aug. 7, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/07/us-dea-irs-idUSBRE9761AZ20130807.
82
Id.
83
Mark Sherman, Gov’t Obtains Wide AP Phone Records in Probe, The Associated Press
(May 13, 2013) http://bigstory.ap.org/article/govt-obtains-wide-ap-phone-records-probe.
84
Id. However, the article did note that U.S. officials previously stated it was conducting
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report on proposed changes regarding its policy towards the press.88 On February 21,
2014, the DOJ released new guidelines on how the DOJ will seek information from the
press.89
The guidelines begin with the statement that “[The DOJ]’s policy is intended to provide
protection to members of the news media from certain law enforcement tools, whether
criminal or civil, that might unreasonably impair ordinary newsgathering activities.”90
In order to pursue a criminal investigation against a journalist for an act done within the
scope of a journalist’s activities, the DOJ must get express authorization from the Office
of Public Affairs and the attorney general. 91
In determining whether to obtain information from the press, the DOJ must “strike the
proper balance” between: (1) protecting national security, (2) ensuring public safety, (3)
promoting effective law enforcement and the fair administration of justice, and (4)
safeguarding the essential role of the free press in fostering government accountability
and an open society.92
The DOJ’s new policy towards seeking any type of court orders to obtain information
from the press is that such orders should be used only as “extraordinary measures, not
standard investigatory practices.”93 In a criminal investigation, each tool employed by the
government must meet the following standard: (1) there should be reasonable grounds to
believe, based on public information, or information from non-media sources, that a
crime has been committed, (2) that the information sought is essential to the successful
investigation or prosecution of that crime, and (3) the request should not be used to obtain
peripheral, nonessential, or speculative information.94
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records in leak investigations, The Washington Post (Feb. 22, 2014)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-revises-rules-forobtaining-media-records-in-leak-investigations/2014/02/21/a6484a14-9b64-11e3-ad71e03637a299c0_story.html.
90
Id. at § 50.10(a)(1).
91
28 C.F.R. § 50.10(f)(1) (“No member of the Department shall subject a member of the
news media to questioning as to any offense that he or she is suspected of having
committed in the course of, or arising out of, the coverage or investigation of news, or
while engaged in the performance of duties undertaken as a member of the news media”).
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Under the new rules, the attorney general must personally authorize any application for a
court order that is directed towards the press.95 There are two exceptions to this
requirement. The first is when the journalist agrees to turn over the information if she is
officially subpoenaed.96 The second -- under exigent circumstances involving national
security or harm to an individual, the deputy assistant attorney general for the Criminal
Division can authorize an application for a court order, “if there is reason to believe that
the immediate seizure of the materials at issue is necessary to prevent the death of, or
serious bodily injury to, a human being.”97
One of the major policy changes advanced in Attorney General Eric Holder’s report was
to eliminate the presumption that the media not be notified of a court order. His
recommendation was that there be a presumption in favor of advanced notice. The
presumption would only be overcome when the attorney general determines there is a
“compelling reason” that advance notice would pose either (1) a clear and substantial
threat to the integrity of an investigation, (2) risk grave harm to national security, or (3)
present an imminent risk of death or serious bodily harm.” Delay created by notice,
negotiations or potential judicial review would not be considered “compelling reasons.”98
Holder’s statement became part of DOJ’s new guidelines.99 Under the section, the DOJ
must give the press “reasonable and timely notice” prior to seeking a court order, unless
there is a “compelling reason.”100 When the attorney general determines there is a
“compelling reason” not to give notice, he must give notice forty-five days after the court
order has been issued. The period can be renewed only once, and “[n]o further delays
may be sought beyond the ninety-day period.”101
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